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BANNING THE TRUTH-FINDER IN
EMPLOYMENT: THE EMPLOYEE
POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT OF
19881
The law is often asked to resolve disputes between parties with widely
disparate interests who have clashed on a particular point. The issue of
polygraph or lie detector examinations in private employment is no ex-
ception. Supporters of polygraph use espouse the legitimate rights of bus-
inesses to protect themselves from employee misconduct.2 Opponents argue
just as vehemently that to probe someone's body to make a determination
of whether he is telling the truth is inherently offensive to civil rights. 3
Throw into the fray significant disagreement over whether and to what
extent the polygraph machine is effective4 and it becomes clear that the
issue of polygraph examinations in the employment area was ripe for legal
action. Responding to these concerns, the United States Congress, after
over twenty-five years of debate, passed the Employee Polygraph Protection
Act of 1988. 5 The Act attempts to resolve many of the conflicts which
surround polygraphs by banning the machine's use except in narrow cases
where such use is deemed justified.
This Article will analyze the Act and its likely effects. Part I details
the history of the polygraph machine, showing how the battle lines have
1. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2001-2009
(1988) [hereinafter the Act].
2. "The polygraph is indispensable in protecting the customers, employees,
inventories, and assets of American business and industry ... and they ... are
entitled to access to the polygraph." Polygraphs in the Workplace: Hearings before
the Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1987)
[hereinafter Hearings 1987] (testimony of William J. Scheve, Jr., Pres., American
Polygraph Ass'n).
3. "If the right to privacy means anything at all in our society, it means
that people are entitled to have thoughts, hopes, desires, and dreams that are
beyond the grasping reach of a bureaucrat, an employer, or an electronic technician."
Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs and Similar Devices by Federal Agencies Before
the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations and Government Information, of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 784 (1974) (statement of
Sen. Sam Ervin) [hereinafter Polygraph Hearings 19741 (quoted in Gardner, Wire-
tapping the Mind: A Call to Regulate Truth Verification in Employment, 21 SAN
DiGo L. REv. 295, 295 (1984)). See generally Wise, Trial By Machine, 12 Hum.
Rrs., fall 1984, at 30.
4. See infra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
5. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2001-2009
(1988). 1
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been drawn. Part II discusses the Act itself and includes relevant points
which the Act does not address. Part III predicts the likely ramifications
of the Act in the courts and on employment.
I
In 1929, John Larson developed the first polygraph machine, building
on a theory that humans exhibit different physical responses when they
are lying than when they are telling the truth. Larson developed a machine
which measured the subject's blood pressure, pulse, and respiration.6 Later,
an assistant to Larson, Leonarde Keeler, added a galvanic skin reading.
This is the basic machine in use today.7 Despite its awe-inspiring name,
the lie detector actually just measures a subject's physiological characteristics
in response to questions.
Typically, pneumatic tubes measure the rate and depth of the subject's
respiration; a blood pressure check monitors his cardiovascular activity;
and electrodes attached to his fingertips" measure his skin conductance. 9
The subject then responds to questions from the examiner while his phys-
6. Comment, Employer-Employee Relations - The Employee Polygraph Pro-
tection Act: Eliminating Polygraph Testing in Private Employment is Not the
Answer, 11 S. ILL. U.L.J. 355, 357 n.7 (1987) [hereinafter Employer Relations].
For a discussion of primitive methods of lie detection, see Nagle, The Polygraph
in the Workplace, 18 U. Rc. L. Ruv. 43, 44-45 (1983), where the author discusses
the Code of Hammurabi, whereby one accused of lying was thrown into a sacred
river and if he did not drown, he was telling the truth. In India, a subject was
given dry rice to chew, and if he spit it out, he was deemed not guilty on the
theory that one who lies cannot produce saliva. The Arabs would place a hot iron
on the tongue of a suspected liar, reasoning that a liar would not produce saliva
and, thus, bum his tongue. See also Comment, The Polygraph Protection Act of
1985: Bobbing Pinocchio's New Nose?, 43 WASH. & LEn L. REv. 1411, 1412 n.10
(1985) (citing S. ABRAMS, A POLYGRAPH HANDBOOK FOR ATTOrmYs 11-12 (1977)),
stating that in Tibet, retrieving a stone from boiling water indicated truthfulness
and in Africa, poison or boiling water was used. See generally Hurd, Use of the
Polygraph in Screening Job Applicants, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 529, 529-30 (1985);
Toomey, Compelled Lie Detector Tests and Public Employees: What Happened to
the Fifth Amendment?, 21 S. TEx. L.J. 375, 376 (1981). For a discussion of the
history of the development of the polygraph, see Hermann, Privacy, the Prospective
Employee and Employment Testing: The Need to Restrict Polygraph and Personality
Testing, 47 WASH. L. REv. 73, 77-79 (1971); Nagle, supra, at 46-47; Toomey,
supra, at 376.
7. Hermann, supra note 6, at 77-79; see also Toomey, supra note 6, at
376; Nagle, supra note 6, at 46-47; Employer Relations, supra note 6, at 357.
8. Wiseman, Invasion by Polygraph: An Assessment of Constitutional and
Common Law Parameters, 32 ST. Louis U.L.J. 21, 27-28 (1987). For a detailed
discussion of the various responses. measured, see Nagel, supra note 6, at 49-50.
9. "Conductance," as used in this context, is a measurement of the human
body's resistance. As one sweats, the conductance of the body increases. Supporters
of the polygraph claim that as someone lies he tends to sweat more.
[Vol. 54
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iological characteristics are continuously measured. The examiner interprets
all changes in deciding whether the subject is telling the truth.10
Polygraph examiners use three general methods to make these truth
determinations: the relevant/irrelevant test; the control question test; and
the concealed knowledge test." The relevant/irrelevant (R/I) test was the
first method developed. It requires the examiner to ask both relevant and
irrelevant questions. The examiner then measures the physiological response,
the theory being that one who is lying will respond differently to questions
which are relevant than to those which are irrelevant. Similarly, a truthful
subject should have the same reactions to all questions. Thus, the test
detects lying subjects based upon physiological changes manifested after
being asked the relevant questions.' 2
The second method, the control question technique (CQT), builds upon
the R/I method. The examiner -still asks relevant and irrelevant questions,
but interspersed are various "control" questions. These questions probe
the background of the subject for one of two reasons: either to determine
whether the subject shows a pattern of behavior which indicates he is the
type of person who will commit the act in question (i.e., stealing from
an employer); or to determine the subject's base by measuring his response
to questions concerning situations which all people have faced (e.g., Have
you ever stolen anything-ever?), so that his reactions to the control
questions can be compared to those of the relevant questions. 3 Hence, the
10. It is for this reason that many people feel that polygraphs should not
be used. For a discussion of the difference when an experienced polygrapher gives
a test as opposed to an inexperienced examiner, see Nagel, supra note 6, at 52;
Comment, Regulation of Polygraph Testing in the Employment Context: Suggested
Statutory Control on Test Use and Examiner Competence, 15 U.C. DAvis L. Rnv.
113, 124-26 (1981); see also Gardner, supra note 3, at 304-05. For an argument
that the device does not detect lies, but that the examiner does, see D. LYKKEN,
A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD 85 (1981); Skolnick, Scientific Theory and Scientific
Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694, 699 (1961). For an
argument that the most experienced examiners will be the most consistently correct,
see Horvath & Reid, The Reliability of Polygraph Examiner Diagnosis of Truth
and Deception, 62 J. OF Clm. LAw 276 (1971); accord Hartsfield, Polygraphs, 36
LAB. L.J. 817, 830 (1985) (citing Office of Technology and Assessment Report,
Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing, Nov. 1983 [hereinafter OTA Report], which
states experienced polygraphers were correct 91.4% of the time and inexperienced
polygraphers were correct only 77.5%).
11. Wiseman, supra note 8, at 29.
12. A good discussion of the relevant/irrelevant technique can be found in
Raskin, The Polygraph in 1986: Scientific, Professional and Legal Issues Surrounding
Application and Acceptance of Polygraph Evidence, 1986 UTAH L.J. 29, 32-34.
The article discusses specific questions which can be asked and how they are applied.
See also Hartsfield, supra note 10, at 830, stating that both relevant and irrelevant
questions must be asked during a polygraph examination. For a general discussion
on polygraph interrogation, see Hermann, supra note 6, at 79-88.
13. Wiseman, supra note 8, at 29. For a discussion of the control question
technique, see supra note 12.
1989]
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R/I and CQT are similar; each tries to determine deception from a certain
base; however, the base is different for each test.
The third method, the concealed information technique (also called the
guilty knowledge test), is more limited. It seeks to find deception by asking
a series of questions including at least one of which only a person with
knowledge of the act in question would know is important. 14 The theory
behind this technique is that those who have no connection to the incident
will react the same to all questions, while those who were involved will
react differently to questions directly concerning the incident." Nonetheless,
in each of the methods, the polygraph examiner does not detect lies, but
simply interprets results of physiological changes in relation to the predicted
response for truth tellers and for liars.
Many studies have tried to determine the accuracy of polygraphs. Their
results are varied, ranging from Department of Defense estimates of a near
perfect record of detecting deception' 6 to American Medical Association
claims that the accuracy rate is so low that an examiner might just as well
flip a coin to determine whether the subject is lying.' 7 Between these extremes
are many other studies, none of which proves conclusively the accuracy
of polygraph results. 8 Inherent problems with any study done to determine
the polygraph's validity may be one explanation of this uncertainty. There
are basically two kinds of studies, laboratory and field. Laboratory studies
involve assigning volunteers to roles of either the "guilty" or "innocent"
party in a mock theft. The polygraph examiner then attempts to determine
which subjects are telling the truth and which are lying.' 9 The difficulty
with such tests is that the "guilty" subject does not have a guilty mental
state; since he knows nothing will happen to him if he is caught, his
14. Wiseman, supra note 8, at 29. For an argument that the guilty knowledge
test should be the only lie detection test allowed, see Kleinmuntz & Szucko, On
the Fallibility of Lie Detection, 17 LAW & SociErY REv. 85, 98-101 (1983).
15. Wiseman, supra note 8, at 29.
16. Hearings 1987, supra note 2, at 54. The Department of Defense report
suggests that it tested 3,993 persons with only 13 being found to be deceptive,
eight of whom made admissions during the testing of their guilt. The Defense
Intelligence Agency reports that of 13,595 persons tested, only 17 were found to
be deceptive and many had satisfactory explanations for the polygraph reading. It
is not known how many false negatives (that is, guilty people who actually tested
innocent) were found by the study.
17. Hearings 1987, supra note 2, at 19. The AMA indicated that the best
that could be said was that the polygraph was an indication of guilt, but that a
subject is no better off than if the examiner had flipped a coin to decide whether
or not he was being truthful.
18. For a compilation of polygraph studies with widely disparate results,
see Tiner & O'Grady, Lie Detectors in Employment, 23 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
85 (1988). The studies cited there indicate a high reading of 91% accuracy and a
low of nearly 50% accuracy.
19. Id. at 92.
[Vol. 54
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responses may differ from those of an actual guilty party. 2° Therefore, the
examiner may have a more difficult time determining who is telling the
truth. Field studies, on the other hand, compare the results of polygraphs
given to suspects with their final adjudication. 2' The problem with this
approach is obvious. Not all those who are adjudged guilty actually are,
and vice versa. Hence, the question of which process is more accurate is
not clear. If the polygraph examiner determines the subject was innocent,
but the criminal process adjudges him guilty, it is not clear which decision
is correct.
One study tried to alleviate this problem by examining the results of
one hundred polygraph subjects, fifty of whom later confessed to the full
crime and fifty where another confessed to the crime. 22 The study found
that the false positive rate-an innocent person being labeled as guilty-
was 37 percent, and led the authors to conclude "the lie detector test is
indeed highly fallible, and that this fallibility translates into a strong bias
against the innocent respondent."' The majority of the field studies have
concentrated on polygraphs given to criminals and to alleged participants
in other identifiable incidents, and not in the area of pre-employment
screening. Whether the results of these studies can transfer easily into the
pre-employment screening area is unknown. 24 Such pre-employment poly-
20. Id. This study details four laboratory studies of polygraphs. One done
by the University of Utah in 1975 staged a mock theft and student volunteers were
assigned to either the "guilty" or the "innocent" roles. The study found that 35%
of the tests were inconclusive and 12% were incorrect. The highest percentage
reached by any study was an 80% correct rate for deceptive subjects. Interestingly,
the highest correct reading cited was by a visual examination of the subjects by
the examiner-86%.
21. Id.
22. Kleinmuntz & Szucko, supra note 14, at 95-96.
23. Id.
24. Hermann, supra note 6, at 85, notes:
The polygraph is designed to obtain a response with regard to a specific
incident. Its utility for determining a broad question such as the suitability
of an individual for a particular position is marginal when the broad
inquiry is being made for predictive purposes. It is doubtful that the
polygraph is a reliable means of determining whether an individual will
be a good worker, or will be dependable, or will steal.
Id. (footnote omitted). The author notes three other objections to the use of
polygraphs in pre-employment screening: 1) that it can only obtain information on
post-conduct, 2) often the ones who should be caught get away, and 3) civil
libertarian grounds. Id. at 85-86. See also Skolnick, supra note 10, where the
author states:
Whatever the unconditional accuracy of the lie detector, the number of
false positives it diagnoses is going to be related to the number of true
positives in the population being tested. This fact would make the use of
lie detectors, even if they had high unconditional accuracy, questionable
in those situations, such as personnel screening in which there are a few
1989]
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graph examinations have been called "quickie"' ' tests because they last
only about fifteen minutes. Studies have shown consistently that the shorter
the polygraph examination, the less chance it has of being accurate. 26 In
the context of widespread polygraph use, this inaccuracy becomes very
important. The private sector gave an estimated two million polygraph tests
in 1987, up from 250,000 just ten years previously. 27 Of these, over 70
percent were pre-employment screening or "quickie" tests, 15 percent were
post-employment random tests and another 15 percent were responses to
a specific incident of conduct.2s Thus, private employers gave the least
accurate of the polygraph exams more frequently than other types.2 9
true positives in the population.
Id. at 727. Another factor which may tend to increase the number of false positives
is the fact that the polygraph operator works for the employer and is more likely
to keep his job if he sacrifices some false positives in order to catch all of the
suspected individuals. Hence, he has a reason to call as many people as possible
untruthful. For an analysis of this phenomenon, see L. TAYLOR, SCiMNT IC IN-
TERROGATION: HYPNOsIS, POLYGRAPHY, NARcoANALYSIs Voicn STREss AND PuPI-
LOMEmThCS 243-44 (1984) (cited in Tiner & O'Grady, supra note 18, at 100-01).
25. The name comes from the fact that the test given is a short 15 minute
test which purports to determine if the subject is lying. Even many of those who
support the polygraph believe that this is an invalid test. F. Lee Bailey, a strong
supporter of polygraphs, so indicated, stating that in his view the quickie tests
were a misnomer and that to get an accurate polygraph test one would need a
minimum of several hours. 1988 U.S. CODE & CONG. ADmIN. NEws (102 Stat.)
731.
26. See supra note 18; see also 134 CONG. REc. S1797 (daily ed. Mar. 2,
1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("I am sick and tired of people using this instrument
in an improper way, knowing that with 15-minute quickie polygraphs, virtually all
of them are not accurate."). The American Polygraph Association is quoted as
saying:
Despite many years of development of the polygraph, the scientific evidence
is still unsatisfactory for the validity of psychophysiological indicators to
infer deceptive behavior. Such evidence is particularly poor concerning the
polygraph use in employment screening.
Id. at S1644.
27. See, e.g., Hearings 1987, supra note 2, at 9, 18 (testimony of Ernest
Dubester and John F. Berry III). The two million figure has been attributed to
the American Polygraph Association; however, its president denied claiming the
two million figure. Id. at 53 (testimony of William J. Scheve, Jr.).
28. U.S. CODE & CONG. ADmN. NEws, supra note 25, at 733-34.
29. Studies indicate that a large number of businesses use the polygraph
machine. One study attempted to determine how many of the major United States
firms used the polygraph, the manner and purpose of the tests, and the rationale
for using the polygraph. The study (done in 1978) indicated that over one-fourth
of all major firms used the polygraph machine, especially banks and retail companies.
Of these companies, one-third used polygraphs in pre-employment screening and
for random post-employment tests. Ninety percent, however, used polygraphs to
investigate specific instances of conduct. Another significant number was that 40
percent of the companies not using polygraphs at that time would consider using
them in the future. Hurd, supra note 6, at 533 n.32 (citing Belt & Holden, Polygraph
Usage Among Major U.S. Corporations, PERSONNEL J. 80 (Feb. 1978)). 6
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The problems surrounding the polygraph did not go unnoticed among
the states. When the federal Polygraph Protection Act was passed, only
seven states had not enacted any kind of legislation concerning the use or
regulation of polygraphs. 30 Twelve states not only ban an employer from
requiring a polygraph examination, but also ban an employer's requesting
the employee to take an examination. 31 Ten other states ban only a re-
quirement of the use of the polygraph as part of employment, but allow
an employer to request the exam be taken. 32 Finally, twenty-one states have
imposed various forms of regulation on the polygraph machine and on
polygraph examiners, but have not banned its use.33
When the federal legislation was proposed, much of the opposition in
Congress was based on the fact that most of the states had acted in regard
to polygraphs. The opponents concluded that the federal government should
not intrude in an area which was governed, for the most part, by state
law .34 Supporters, however, claimed that the state systems and controls did
30. Colorado, Kansas, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio and Wyoming do
not have any laws concerning the use of polygraphs in employment. New York,
however, does prohibit the use of psychological stress evaluators, another machine
used to detect lies, in the employment area. N.Y. LAB. LAws §§ 733-38 (1986).
31. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51g (1987);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 704 (1985); ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 7166 (1988);
MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 19B (West 1982); MicH. Comp. LAw § 37.203
(1985); Mm-i. STAT. § 181.75 (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 40A-1 (West 1982);
OR. REv. STAT. § 659.225 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAws § 28-6-1 (1986); WASH. R.v.
CODE §§ 49.44.0-.130 (1986); W. VA. CODE § 21-5-5b (1985).
32. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1988); HAw. Rlv. STAT. §§ 378-26 to
-29 (1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-903 to -904 (1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 730.4 (West
1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, § 95 (1986); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-304 (1987);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 81-1932 (1987); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7321 (Purdon
1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 494(a) (1987); Wis. STAT. § 111.37 (1985).
33. ALA. CODE § 34-25 (1985); Amz. REv. STAT. ANN § 32-2701 (1986);
ARK. STAT. Am. § 17-32 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN §§ 493.561-.579 (West 1981);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-5001 to -5016 (1985); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 111, para. 2401-
38 (Smith-Hurd 1988); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 25-30-2-1 to -5 (West 1988); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 329.010-.990 (Baldwin 1983); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 37.2831-
.2854 (West 1988); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-1 to -47 (1973); NEv. REv. STAT.
§§ 648.005-.210 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 61-26-1 to -19 (1978); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 74c-1 to -33 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-31-01 to -17 (1978); OKLA.
STAT. ANm. tit. 59, §§ 1451-76 (West 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. §§40-53-10 to -250
(Law. Co-op. 1986); S.D. CODIFmiD LAWS Am. §§ 36-30-1 to -3 (1986); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 62-27-101 to -124 (1986); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4413
(29cc) (Vernon 1982); UTAH CODE ANm. §§ 34.27-1 to .37-14 (1982); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 54-916 to -922 (1982).
34. See, e.g., Minority View of Senator Quayle, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADm[N.
NEws, supra note 25, at 744-45. Senator Quayle opposed the legislation, not based
upon any belief of the reliability of the polygraph, but because he does not believe
that this is an area in which the federal government should intrude. Compare the
opinion of Justice Stevens: "Today there should be universal agreement on the
proposition that Congress has ample power to regulate the terms and conditions
1989]
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not work. They pointed to situations where a company that wished to hire
an employee in a state which banned polygraph use would instead "hire"
the employee in a nearby state that did not prohibit polygraphs, force the
prospective employee to take the exam, then if the subject passed the exam,
"transfer" her back to the original state.35 In this manner, employers could
and did circumvent tough state laws regulating the use of polygraphs and
take advantage of more lax restrictions in neighboring states.
Dismissals of employees for failing polygraph examinations and for
refusing to submit to an examination have produced many lawsuits. De-
cisions in these suits generally parallel the jurisdiction's laws concerning
polygraph examinations. States which have not passed laws on the subject
hold that no cause of action arises because an employer can fire an at-
will employee for any reason or no reason at all and that the discharge
violates no public policy.16 States which have restricted polygraph use have
allowed a cause of action for wrongful discharge against an employer who
dismisses an employee based upon the failure of or refusal to take a
polygraph examination 7 Thus, in general, for a dismissed employee to
recover on a theory of wrongful discharge, the state in which he was
employed must have restricted the use of polygraphs.38 Further, government
employees who have challenged mandatory polygraph tests as a condition
of employment on constitutional grounds have had limited success. While
some courts hold that the government has an interest which overrides the
protection, others have held that the mandatory use violates the Consti-
tution.39
of employment throughout the economy." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 248
(1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) for the proposition that this is a law Congress is
empowered to make.
35. See, e.g., Hearings 1987, supra note 2, at 83-84 (statement of Floyd
S. Perlman), where Mr. Perlman describes his application for employment process.
Mr. Perlman was applying for a position in Maryland, which allows an employer
to request a polygraph exam. He was told that if he refused, he would be assigned
to the Virginia office where he would have been forced to take an examination.
See generally Gardner, supra note 3, at 310-14; Hermann, supra note 6, at 97-
102; Hurd, supra note 6, at 541; Comment, supra note 6, at 1418-22.
36. See, e.g., Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907
(1977); Cipov v. International Harvester Co., 134 Ill. App. 3d. 522, 481 N.E.2d
22 (1985); Ising v. Barnes Hosp., 674 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Grynberg
v. Alexander's Inc., 133 A.D.2d 667, 519 N.Y.S.2d 838 (1987); Walden v. General
Mills Restaurant Group, 31 Ohio App. 3d 11, 508 N.E.2d 168 (1986).
37. See, e.g., Polsky v. Radio Shack, 666 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying
Pennsylvania law); Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 494 A.2d 212 (1985); Cyrus
v. Calhoun County Sheriff, 85 Mich. App. 397, 271 N.W.2d 249 (1978); Cordle
v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984).
38. But see, e.g., Hood v. Alabama State Personnel Bd., 516 So. 2d 680
(Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (holding that an employee could not be fired for refusing
to take a polygraph even though there was no Alabama law proscribing its use).
39. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Philadelphia, 845 F.2d 1216 (3d Cir.
[Vol. 54
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It was against this backdrop that Congress passed the Employee Pol-
ygraph Protection Act. The Act attempts to provide a balance between
the competing interests of the employee's right to privacy and the employer's
right to protect his business. It does this by banning the use of the polygraph
for any pre-employment screening use, yet retaining its use in well-delineated
circumstances where a theft of an employer's property has occurred40 The
basic premise of the Act is that the "quickie" polygraph tests given during
pre-employment screening are inherently inaccurate and that they should
not be allowed; however, when given in a thorough manner and when not
used as the sole criterion for determining guilt or innocence, the polygraph
can be an effective tool to help prevent employee theft.
The Act defines "lie detector" broadly to include not only the polygraph
test, but also voice stress analyzers, deceptographs, psychological stress
evaluator or any other device which purports to determine the truth or
honesty of an individual. 4' By using the broad definition, Congress brought
within the auspices of the Act all tests and machines which attempt to
determine whether an individual is lying. Thus, although the Act's title
suggests that only the polygraph is treated, its coverage is actually broader.
The Act also gives a broad definition to "employer", covering anyone
who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of any employer, thereby
covering both the employer itself and its agents. 42
The Act states that no employer may: request, require, suggest, or
cause any employee or prospective employee to take a polygraph exami-
nation; use any results of the lie detector test; discharge an employee or
deny employment to a prospective employee who refuses to take a lie
detector test; nor discharge an employee because he filed a complaint or
caused any proceeding to be instituted based upon a violation of the Act.43
Thus, the Act proscribes not only the use of polygraph tests and their
results, but also bans actions by an employer which are taken in retaliation
to an employee exercising his rights under the Act. This prevents an employer
from doing indirectly what he cannot do directly-fire an employee for
not taking a polygraph examination.-
1988), holding that governmental interests overrode the constitutional protections,
and Texas State Employees Union v. Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental
Retardation, 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1987), holding that the mandatory polygraph
test offended the employee's right to privacy.
40. Although the Act purports to be a ban on polygraphs, it exempts some
situations. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. §2006 (1988).
41. Id. § 2001(3).
42. Id. § 2001(2).
43. Id. § 2002(l)-(4).
44. Without this protection, an employer could fire an employee and frustrate
the purpose of the Act. The retaliation clause is similar to the judicially created
doctrine banning retaliatory eviction; see, e.g., Robinson v. Diamond Housing
Corp., 453 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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The ban on polygraphs is effective for both employees and prospective
employees. 45 The Act bans the unreliable "quickie" lie detector along with
other, longer tests. Further, it requires that all employers post a notice,
prepared by the Secretary of Labor, of the Act's provisions. 46 The notice
must be posted in a conspicuous area where notices are generally posted
for both employees and applicants.47
The Act has separate enforcement provisions. It states that an employer
who violates the Act can be subject to a civil penalty of up to $10,000,
based upon the employer's previous record and the gravity of the violations.41
It provides the Secretary of Labor with the power to bring an action in
federal court to enjoin an employer from further violations. 49 An employee
cannot waive his rights under the Act unless such waiver is part of a
written settlement.5 0 Finally, and most importantly, the Act creates a private
cause of action for employees and prospective employees against employers
for its violations.5 1 The employer can be held liable for any appropriate
legal or equitable relief, including reinstatement, employment, back wages,
promotion, and benefits.52 The Act provides for Federal and State court
45. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. 2002(l)-(4)
(1988).
46. Id. § 2003. The Secretary of Labor must distribute the notice within 90
days after the effective date of the Act. Temporary regulations were issued by the
Department of Labor on October 21, 1988. These temporary regulations will govern
the enforcement of the Act from its effective date until the final regulations are
published. The Labor Department's Employment Standards Administration has noted
several issues subject to change such as the scope of the exceptions and the definitions
of "prospective employee" and "on-going investigation." An analysis of these
concerns can be found at 57 U.S.L.W. 2277-78 (1988).
47. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2002(1)-(4)
(1988). The notice must be placed in an area where notices are generally posted
for applicants because the Act covers prospective employees. Obviously, prospective
employees would not be able to see the notice if it were placed only in employees'
areas; hence, the additional protection is required. Section 2004 of the Act empowers
the Secretary to make inspections to ensure that the notices are posted and also
gives him power of subpoena for any hearing or investigation under the Act.
48. Id. § 2005(a)(1)-(2). The Act also states that the fines shall be collected
in the same manner as fines under the Migrant and Seasonal Agriculture Worker
Protection Act in § 2005(a)(3).
49. Id. § 2005(b).
50. Id. § 2005(d). This clause shows that any employee's right to be free
of the polygraph cannot be waived at all. It is intended to avoid strong-arm tactics
by an employer to get an employee to freely give his "consent." See, e.g., Hester
v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1987). However, reasonably, the
Act allows an employee to waive his rights pursuant to a written settlement-a
device to help settle lawsuits before they go to trial.
51. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2005(c)
(1988).
52. It would, of course, be impossible to reinstate an employee who has
never been hired, a prospective employee. Damages for these persons would probably
more likely take the form of monetary recoveries.
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jurisdiction for such causes of action and a three year statute of limitations.
The court as well has discretion to award reasonable costs including at-
torneys' fees to the prevailing party.53 Significantly, the Act does not create
any cause of action against the polygraph examiner or the company em-
ploying the examiner. Thus, the onus of compliance falls squarely on the
shoulders of the employer, who is solely responsible for any liability which
may result from a violation of the Act.
The Act provides for several situations (discussed below) where an
employee can be required to take a lie detector test, regardless of the Act's
general prohibition.5 4 In these situations, the Act secures certain rights to
such employees. The employee's primary right is that the employer cannot
use the polygraph examination as the sole basis for taking an employment
action, whether dismissal, denial of employment or promotion, or other
action. 5 It can be used only as supporting evidence for the decision. Further,
the Act limits the types of questions an examiner may ask, and states that
the employer may not administer the exam if the examinee's physician
provides sufficient written evidence that the examinee is medically at risk
if he takes the exam. If the employee takes the examination, the Act
mandates that the examinee may terminate the test at any time and that
the employer may not use such refusal or termination as the sole criterion
for making an employment decision.56 The Act details other rights of
employees who are subject to a polygraph test for the pre-test, actual test,
and post-test phases.57
53. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2005(a)(l)-
(3) (1988).
54. See infra notes 60-78 and accompanying text.
55. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(a)(1)
(1988).
56. Id. § 2007(b)(1). For example, the employee cannot be asked about his
religious beliefs, beliefs on racial or political (including union activities) matters,
nor anything dealing with sexual behavior. These types of questions were often
asked in the past, often with no justifiable reason. Many people found these
questions offensive and opposed polygraph exams because of them. See generally
Hearings 1987, supra note 2, at 125-26 (statement of William H. Wynn) (citing
OTA report, supra note 10, at 32); Gardner, supra note 3, at 299-300; Hermann,
supra note 6, at 79-88; Tiner & O'Grady, supra note 18, at 87-89; Comment,
Employee Polygraph Testing, supra note 3, at 299-300.
57. The rights granted are very specific. In the pre-test phase, the subject
must be provided with reasonable written notice of the date and location of the
exam, as well as his right to obtain legal counsel. The examinee must also be told
in writing of the nature and extent of the polygraph exam and whether two-way
mirrors or other observation devices will be used. A recording of the test may be
made by either the examiner or the subject, as long as both agree to it in a written
statement. Further, the subject must sign a written statement informing him: that
he cannot be forced to take the test as a condition of employment; that any
statements can be used as evidence in an employment decision; the limitations
imposed by the Act; his legal rights and remedies for violations of the Act; and
19891
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In addition, the maximum number of tests an examiner can give is
five per day and no test shall be given for less than 90 minutes. The Act
requires examiners to be licensed in the state in which they practice (if
state law so requires) and to post $50,000 worth of professional liability
coverage.58 Information obtained during a polygraph examination is con-
fidential. The examiner can release information only to the employee, the
employer, or to a court of competent jurisdiction. Employers can release
the information only to the same persons and to governmental agencies
in connection with criminal conduct.5 9
Most of the controversy over the statute stems from the exemptions
which it grants. 60 Critics question whether the premise of the Act-that lie
detectors are inaccurate-is at odds with allowing the tests in the situations
where exemptions have been granted.6 1 To a certain degree, this argument
is appealing. But it does not address the fact that the lie detector tests
banned are the ones which are essentially inaccurate, and the tests which
are longer and more accurate are the ones for which exemptions were
granted. Congress included the exemptions, it seems, to bridge the gap
between protecting employee's privacy and the reasonable business require-
ments of the employer.
the rights of the employer. Finally, the employee must be allowed to review all
the questions to be asked before the test is given. Employee Polygraph Protection
Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007(b)(2)(A)-(E) (1988). During the actual test, the
examiner is not allowed to ask questions that had not previously been reviewed
by the employee. Id. § 2007(b)(3). Finally, during the post-test phase, before any
employment action is taken, the employer must interview the employee based upon
the results of the test, provide the employee with a written copy of any opinion
or conclusion gleaned from the test, and further provide the employee with a
written copy of the questions asked during the test.
58. Id. § 2007(c). The Act further details that the examiner can base any
conclusions only on admissions by the employee during the test and interpretations
of the charts. Furthermore, the examiner is not allowed to render any employment
recommendation based upon his findings and must keep all records, opinions,
charts, questions and other matters relating to the test for at least three years.
59. Id. § 2008. "Information" is not defined in the Act. It is possible to
interpret that "information" does not include inferences drawn by the examiner
as to the subject's truthfulness. Thus, the examiner's opinion as to the subject's
veracity can be freely dispersed. This, however, would not further the Act's goal
of protecting employees who take polygraph exams and the Act is not likely to
be interpreted in this manner.
60. See, e.g., 134 CONG. REc., supra note 26, at S1697-99, where Senator
Quayle argues that the exemptions represent a double standard. See also St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, September 18, 1988, at Fl, col. 5, where a polygraph supporter
rhetorically asks "If they're so bad, how come the Government can use them?"
61. 134 CONG. REc., supra note 26, at S1697-99. Senator Quayle notes that
he did not oppose the bill because of any belief in the validity of the polygraph
but because he felt it was not an appropriate area for federal legislation. He argues
that if polygraphs are unreliable for one group of people, they should be unreliable
for all. See also Post Dispatch, supra note 60, at F1, col. 5.
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The first exemption, and the one which sparked the most controversy,
is the exemption for governmental employees. The Act specifically states
that it does not cover all federal, state and local governments. 62 This
provision has been derided as another point where Congress placed itself
above the law.63 However, a closer examination shows that this is not
necessarily the case. One reason is that the committee which reported the
bill, Senate Labor and Human Resources, does not have jurisdiction over
public employees.6A The main reason, however, is that the polygraphs which
the government gives are long exams covering a wide range of topics so
that the subject is tested fairly. 65 It has been shown repeatedly that this
type of test generates much more accurate results than the short exams
employers give in pre-employment screening. 6 Another reason is that the
legitimate concerns of the government often override concerns about em-
ployee rights to privacy. 67 Finally, the subject may assert constitutional
rights, such as the right against self-incrimination and the right against
unreasonable searches, when the government gives the tests.68 Thus, the
government may not ask many objectionable questions which private em-
ployers could ask prior to the ban on lie detectors.
The second exemption denies any ban on lie detector tests given to
employees working in National Defense and Security positions. 69 These
include not only employees of the Department of Defense, Central Intel-
ligence Agency, and other defense agencies but also to employees of private
contractors who work on national defense projects for the government: 0
The reason for this exemption is the overriding concern of national security
in relation to the employees' privacy. It is worthy of note, however, that
the same constitutional protections afforded to governmental employees
may be applicable in this exemption, in that the government is giving the
test.71 The Act also provides for exemptions to the ban on lie detector
62. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(a)
(1988).
63. See, e.g., 134 CoNG. REc., supra note 26, at S1697-99.
64. Policy decisions of whether to extend the protection of the Act to public
sector employees are left to committees with both jurisdiction and expertise. 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmit. NEws 751.
65. The government does not use "quickie" polygraph examinations. See,
e.g., 134 CONG. REc., supra note 26, at S1703-04, where Senator Kennedy explains
that the Defense Intelligence Agency exams last between four and eight hours as
opposed to the 15-minute exams often given in the private sector.
66. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
68. See 134 CONG. REc., supra note 26, at S1703; see also Hermann, supra
note 6, at 126-49; Hurd, supra note 6, at 541-48; Nagel, supra note 6, at 70-73;
Toomey, supra note 6, at 376-85; Wiseman, supra note 9, at 33-55.
69. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(b)
(1988).
70. Id.
71. See supra note 67.
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tests for Federal Bureau of Investigation contractors, Security Services, and
for drug manufacturers and distributors.72
The final major exemption is the limited exemption granted to businesses
for ongoing investigations.7 3 This exemption considers the legitimate interests
of a business in preventing theft. For the exemption to apply, there must
be an ongoing investigation into an economic loss sustained by a business. 74
Further, the employer must show the subject employee had access to the
subject property and that there is a reasonable suspicion that the employee
was involved in the theft.75 Finally, the employer must present a signed
statement to the employee before the test is given which details the incident
being investigated, identifies loss, states that the employee had access to
the property and shows why reasonable suspicion is cast on the employee. 76
Thus, if an employer can reasonably identify an employee who may
be involved in an incident of economic loss, and takes the proper procedural
steps, the employer can use a polygraph test as one indication of the
subject's involvement in the crime. This situation, when a business has
suffered an economic loss, is one in which most businesses feel the use
of the polygraph is necessary.77 Businesses can use the results of a polygraph
examination as evidence, but not the sole evidence of the subject's in-
volvement in the crime. It is also interesting to note that under the ongoing
investigation exemption, unlike the government exemptions, the employer
may use only a polygraph machine and no other lie detection device.78 It
72. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2006(c)(e)(f)
(1988). These exemptions were granted because the Congress felt that the needs of
the industry outweighed the rights of employees. The FBI exemption includes the
Bureau itself and its contractors. The exemption for Security Services covers all
businesses whose primary business purpose consists of providing armored car per-
sonnel and the like, whose function is to protect facilities which have a significant
impact on the safety of people, public water supplies, toxic chemicals, public
transportation or currency. The drug exemption covers employers who manufacture
and distribute drugs or controlled substances listed in Schedule I, II, III or IV of
§ 202 of 21 U.S.C. 812 (1986). The exemption, however, only applies to prospective
employees who would have direct access to the substances or to a current employee
if there is an ongoing investigation and the employee had access to the subject
matter of the investigation. Id.
73. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(d)
(1988).
74. Id. § 2006(d)(1).
75. Id. § 2006(d)(2)-(3).
76. Id. § 2006(d)(4).
77. See Hurd, supra note 6, at 533-34 citing a study in which 90 percent
of the business using polygraphs used them in connection with the investigation
of a specific economic loss.
78. Actually the only times the word "polygraph" appears in the Act is in
the exemption provisions and when the manner of interrogation are discussed,
Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2005, 2006 (1988).
The prohibition, therefore, covers all forms of tests designed to determine a subject's
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appears that Congress believed that it could detail acceptable procedures
only for the polygraph and thus created a near fatal ban on the use of
other lie detection devices in private employment. This exemption tries to
strike a middle ground between the extremes of competing interests. The
employee's right to privacy cannot be violated by the administration of a
polygraph exam unless there has been an economic loss to the business
and such loss is reasonably attributable to the employee.
This middle ground appears to be fairly well-conceived. It avoids the
unfairness of the "quickie" examination given during pre-employment
screening, which employees often view as an infallible measurement of the
subject's guilt or innocence, even though the results from this test have
been proven less reliable than longer polygraph exams. But the Act also
leaves open the possibility of using the longer, more reliable polygraph
test when the employer needs it most-after a theft has occurred-as long
as the results are not used as the sole criterion for dismissal. Those who
oppose polygraph examinations on purely civil libertarian grounds79 un-
doubtedly will not be satisfied with the Act, since it does not create a
total ban. On the contrary, polygraph examiners and those who believe in
the machine's accuracy 0 will also be unhappy, since the Act limits the
right to perform polygraph examinations in private employment. But, based
upon the legitimate needs of both sides, a balanced approach as enunciated
in the Act is probably the best position to take.
There are at least two areas of interest the Act does not address. The
first concerns situations, apart from purely economic loss, in which an
employer might legitimately use a polygraph exam. An example is found
in Ising v. Barnes Hospital Corp.,8 where an at-will employee was asked
to take a polygraph examination to determine if she was responsible for
various acts of harassment and violence against her supervisor. The employee
refused to sign a consent form prior to taking the exam and subsequently
was dismissed. The court ruled that the dismissal was valid because Missouri
did not have a statute concerning polygraph regulation.12 Under the Em-
ployee Polygraph Protection Act, this situation would not trigger the on-
going investigation exemption allowing the employer to give a polygraph
exam because there was no economic loss. It would appear, however, that
the policy reasons for the exemption-the legitimate concerns of a business
veracity. Id. §§ 2001(3)-(4). In fact, Senator Quayle offered an amendment which
would have allowed an exception for other "scientifically valid" tests, but the
amendment was defeated. 134 CONG. REc., supra note 26, at S1699.
79. For a discussion of civil libertarian objections to the polygraph, see
Tiner & O'Grady, supra note 18, at 85-113; Wise, supra note 3, at 30-54.
80. For arguments on the polygraph's validity, see Horvath & Reid, supra
note 10, at 276-81; Nagel, supra note 6, at 51.
81. 674 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
82. Id. at 625-26.
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to protect itself-would apply in a situation of supervisor harassment as
well as for economic loss and that, therefore, a polygraph examination
similarly controlled might be applicable in situations such as these. Congress
may not have wanted to extend the exemption beyond the situation where
an economic loss occurred, simply because economic loss is an objective
measure of harm to the business which is easy to identify, whereas other
damage less objectively measured could lead to abuse.
The second situation not addressed in the statute is a time limitation.
Studies have shown that the longer the time lapse between the occurrence
of an incident and the time of the test, the more likely the possibility of
an incorrect polygraph result.83 This is due, at least in part, to the psy-
chological reaction which, over time, makes one believe that what he thinks
is true actually is true. The longer the exam is delayed, the more the
subject believes certain things to be true and the chances are more likely
that a guilty party can pass a polygraph test. 4 One possible reason that
this was not addressed is that the policy of the Act is to avoid false
negatives from polygraphs 85-that is, innocent people being labeled as
guilty-and a time lapse increases only false positives or guilty people being
labeled as innocent.8" Therefore, a time limitation may not further the
purpose of the Act. As a practical measure, a maximum limit on the time
an employer can invoke the ongoing investigation exemption should have
been set, if only for the same reasons as a general statute of limitations-
the barring of stale claims.
III
Many consequences will flow from the passage of the Act; some are
predictable, others are not. The first consequence, obviously, will be a
decrease in the number of polygraph examinations and commensurate
decrease in the number of licensed polygraphers who can continue making
their living giving exams.87 Since the vast majority of polygraphs given
were during the now banned pre-employment screening,88 it is likely that
83. See, e.g., J. REID & F. INBAu, TRUTH AND DECEPTION, THE POLYGRAPH
("LrE-DETEcToR") TEcHNIQuE 228 (2d ed. 1977).
84. See id.
85. See, e.g., 134 CONo. Ric., supra note 26, at S1644, where Senator
Hatch states that over 320,000 Americans are falsely branded as liars each year.
See also id. at S1799 where Senator Kennedy echoes the thoughts of Senator Hatch.
86. See supra notes 83 and 84 and accompanying text.
87. See Post Dispatch, supra note 60, at Fl, col. 5 where a polygraph
operator states, "Look in the phone book now and there's about 15 (polygraph)
companies. Next year'we'll be lucky if there's seven. Somebody's not going to
make it."
88. The Act does not define what type of an investigation is required, nor
how much effort is necessary before an employer can request a polygraph. However,
since the polygraph had been used previously as the sole method of investigation,
the fact that other effort may be required before the polygraph can be used could
be enough to make employers avoid the use of the polygraph.
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many polygraph companies will fail. Given that employers are the re-
sponsible parties under the act, it is likely that most employers will cease
using polygraphs during pre-employment screening. The number of busi-
nesses that will discontinue using polygraphs entirely is harder to predict.
The costs of pursuing the investigation into a specific incident of thievery
as required by the Act can be high,89 and these costs could force employers
to turn to methods other than polygraph tests to protect their business
interests. 90 Further, states which already have strict statutes on the use of
polygraphs will not be affected, since the Act does not preempt statutes
whose provisions are more restrictive.91
Beyond these, however, the consequences are less clear. Prior to the
passage of the Act, the courts faced a steady stream of litigation in one
of two forms-either governmental 2 or non-governmenta 93 suits. An analysis
of both types of litigation shows that this volume of litigation is unlikely
to subside to any meaningful degree. First, suits involving the government
are unlikely to decrease, and may even increase, because of the Act's
federal, state and local government exemption. 94 However, a constitutional
challenge to the use of polygraphs may make polygraphs invalid for the
government as well. Such a challenge is likely to be based on self-incrim-
ination,95 unreasonable search and seizure, 96 as well as the public employee's
right to privacy. 97
89. One person believes that since businesses will not want to concern
themselves with investigations, an entire shift would be fired when some money
was stolen instead of only the person labeled as guilty by the polygraph. Thus,
he claims, more people will lose their jobs, not fewer. Post Dispatch, supra note
60, at Fl, col 5. Other possible methods of employer protection include background
checks, reference checks and other traditional employment screening methods.
90. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2009 (1988).
91. See, e.g., 1988 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 733.
92. Suits involving the government generally involved claims based in firings
for failing or refusing to take a polygraph test. The claim usually was a violation
of constitutional rights. See, e.g.,, Anderson v. City of Philadelphia, 845 F.2d
1216 (3d Cir. 1988).
93. Non-governmental actions were generally brought on a wrongful discharge
basis - either as being contrary to an express statute or as a public policy exception
to the traditional employee-at-will doctrine that an employee can be fired for any
reason or no reason at all. See, e.g., Ising v. Barnes Hosp., 674 S.W.2d 623 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984) (arguing unsuccessfully that the firing was contrary to public policy);
Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984) (holding
the firing to be a violation of a definitive statute).
94. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2006(a)
(1988).
95. U.S. CoNsT. amend V.
96. The constitutional right to privacy was established in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
97. U.S. CoNsr. amend IV.
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The Third Circuit faced these issues squarely in Anderson v. City of
Philadelphia,98 where the court held that there was no constitutional violation
when a police department gave a prospective officer a polygraph test. The
court ruled that it was not wrongful for the department to dismiss the
officer for failing the exam. 9 But a contrary result was reached in Texas
State Employees Union v. Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation,"' where the Texas Supreme Court held that the mandatory
polygraph policy of the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental
Retardation was offensive to the Texas Constitution (provisions of which
are similar to the United States Constitution). 101 The court decided that
the mandatory policy was an unreasonable invasion of the Department
employees' privacy and that no overriding state interest compelled the
policy, rendering it unconstitutional."' 2 The fact that Anderson dealt with
police officers while Texas Mental Health dealt with mental health workers
distinguishes the cases, insofar as there is a stronger public policy argument
when dealing with police.
The ban on private employers' use of polygraphs can provide a basis
for courts to decide that the government may not use them either, except
in cases where the interests of the government far outweigh the interest
advanced in not giving the examinations. The fact that the Texas Mental
Health case was referred to on the floor of the Senate'013 as a major reason
why the government should be excluded from the Act enhances this con-
clusion. Courts may be more likely to view polygraph tests given to
government employees as impinging on privacy, in that the Senate believed
the Constitution would protect these employees and consequently excluded
them from coverage under the Act.
The second major source of litigation has been private employee actions
based upon dismissals for either failing a polygraph examination or for
refusing to take an exam.104 Significantly, few, if any, reported cases deal
with the situation where an employee is not hired after taking a pre-
employment screening test. 05 Thus, the largest polygraph use, pre-employ-
ment screening, was responsible for the fewest number of lawsuits regarding
polygraphs. Since the major litigable issue-specific incident situations-
have not been banned, it is likely that there will not be a significant
decrease in the number of lawsuits brought. However, because the steps
98. 845 F.2d 1216 (3d Cir. 1988).
99. Id. at 1218-19.
100. 746 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1987).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 204-6.
103. See 134 CONG. REc., supra note 26, at S1641 (statement of Senator
Kennedy).
104. See supra note 93.
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an employer must take before requesting a polygraph examination are
spelled out in the Act, 1' 6 an employer can more readily determine whether
his request for an exam will be legal and possibly avoid a lawsuit. But
nonetheless, the Act contains several requirements that an employee can
claim his employer did not fulfill. For example, employees may challenge
whether there was the requisite "reasonable suspicion," whether the incident
in question actually occurred, and whether they had proper notice -notice
both as to what the incident was and notice of their legal rights. 0 7
Finally, polygraph examiners may be a likely source of a constitutional
challenge to the Act itself, who would gain by barring its enforcement. 0
While the results of such a suit are uncertain, some guidance can be gleaned
from the constitutional challenge to an ordinance banning polygraph tests
of minors in Amato v. County of Suffolk.' °9
In Amato, the plaintiff claimed the law violated due process because
it was too vague, and was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. '"0 He
advanced three arguments asserting the unreasonableness of the law, all
of which the court rejected. The first argument was that only the polygraph
examiner, and not the employer, would be subject to criminal sanctions.
The court rejected this contention, stating that the legislature perceived
that minors were particularly vulnerable to polygraph tests and that pun-
ishing the examiner was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.", The second
argument was that the legitimate business interest of employers applied
equally to those over and under the age of twenty-one, thus barring the
tests only for minors was arbitrary. The court rejected this contention,
again citing the legislature's power and duty to protect minors." 2 Finally,
plaintiff argued that the law was unreasonable since criminal investigations
and certain governmental units were exempt. In rejecting this argument,
the court stated that governmental interests outweighed those of minors." 3
106. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007 (1988)
details the required steps; see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
107. See Post Dispatch, supra note 60, at Fl, col. 5 reporting that suit has
already been filed in California federal court challenging the constitutionality of
the statute. The suit was brought by Chris Gugas, a long-time supporter of the
polygraph test and polygraph examiner. It is also possible that a suit could be
brought by an employee challenging some of the exemptions granted by the statute
on a constitutional privacy claim. However, constitutional protections are not
enforceable against private employers. For an argument that corporations are actually
engaging in state actions, and hence should be subject to the same constitutional
limitations, see Friedman, Corporate Power, Government by Private limitations,
see Friedman, Corporate Power, Government by Private Groups, and the Law, 57
CoLum. L. REv. 155, 176-79 (1957).
108. Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C.A. § 2007 (1988).
109. 668 F. Supp. 151 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
110. Id. at 154.
111. Id. at 155-56.
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The Employee Polygraph Protection Act covers employees of all ages,
therefore arguments concerning age restrictions need not be discussed.
However, the other two arguments rejected in Amato will probably be
advanced by those seeking to overturn the Act; changing, of course, the
contention that it is arbitrary to punish only the examiners for violations
to a contention that it is arbitrary to punish only employers for violations."4
These contentions are likely to be overruled, in that the Act is a fairly
well-balanced solution to the problems created by the clashing of conflicting
views, and the government has a legitimate concern in banning some lie
detector tests.
CONCLUSION
The Employee Polygraph Protection Act charts a middle ground between
the legitimate business concerns of employers and the rights of employees
to their privacy. The law is likely to decrease the number of polygraphs
administered during pre-employment screening, as well as decrease the
number of polygraphers who can make a living plying their trade. The
ongoing investigation exemption is likely to generate a great deal of liti-
gation. In addition, constitutional challenges, both to the Act itself and
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